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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kirk Julliard Gosch appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of manufacturing marijuana, possession of marijuana 
with intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces. 
On appeal, Gosch challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
After conducting surveillance on property located in Hayden, Idaho, 
Detective Terry Morgan obtained a search warrant to search "the premises of 
1197 4 North Rimrock Road" and a "black 1996 Jeep . . . located in [the] 
driveway"; Gosch lived at the residence and owned the Jeep identified in the 
warrant. (R., pp.31-33; Tr. 1, p.9, L.24- p.10, L.4.) The search warrant was 
based upon probable cause to believe the property identified in the warrant 
would contain evidence of drug crimes. (R., pp.31-33.) When law enforcement 
executed the warrant, the Jeep was no longer at the residence; however, a white 
Suzuki, which was registered to an unknown female 2 and which was also present 
during the earlier surveillance, was parked in the driveway. (Tr., p.9, L.13- p.1 0, 
L.12.) A certified drug dog alerted on the Suzuki and a subsequent search of 
that car revealed marijuana and a "white powder substance," suspected to be 
1 There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript 
of the suppression hearing is included twice -as an individual transcript and as 
part of days one and two of the jury trial. All transcript references in this brief will 
be to the individual suppression hearing transcript. 
2 Law enforcement later determined the Suzuki also belonged to Gosch. (See 
Tr., p.10, Ls.5-21; R., p.21.) 
1 
cocaine. (R., p.35; Tr., p.80, L.25- p.82, L.12, p.86, L.21- p.93, L.7, p.109, 
L.24 - p.11 0, L.9.) Several drug-related items were also located in Gosch's 
residence. (R., pp.35-36.) 
The state charged Gosch with trafficking in cocaine, manufacturing 
marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, and possession of 
marijuana in excess of three ounces. (R., pp.46-48, 57-59.) Gosch filed a 
motion to suppress, asserting "the warrant was insufficient and/or the search was 
warrantless and/or the arrest by the officers was unlawful and without legal 
justification." (R., p.67.) The district court denied the motion as well as Gosch's 
subsequent request for an interlocutory appeal regarding his request for 
suppression. (R., pp.154-163, 186, 201-203.) Gosch proceeded to trial at which 
a jury found him guilty of manufacturing marijuana, possession of marijuana with 
intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, but 
acquitted him of the trafficking in cocaine charge. (R., pp.266-267.) The court 
imposed concurrent unified five-year sentences with three years fixed, but 
suspended the sentences and placed Gosch on probation. 3 (R., pp.314-320.) 
Gosch timely appealed from the Amended Judgment, re-filed pursuant to 
relief granted in post-conviction. (R., pp.346, 350-353.) 
3 One month after the court placed Gosch on probation, the state filed a Report 
of Probation Violation. (R., pp.321-324.) Gosch admitted the allegations and 
disposition of the violations was included in a global resolution involving other 
criminal charges, which resulted in revocation of Gosch's probation and 
reduction of the fixed terms of his sentences from three years to one year. (R., 
pp.333-340, 343-345.) Gosch notes in his brief that he has served his 
sentences. (Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
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ISSUE 
Gosch states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Gosch's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Should this Court affirm the district court's order denying Gosch's motion 
to suppress on one of the following bases: (1) an authorized search of particular 
premises includes vehicles located on the premises; (2) the automobile 
exception applies to vehicles parked at a residence without affirmative proof that 
the automobile is "readily mobile"; or (3) inevitable discovery? 
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ARGUMENT 
Gosch Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Gosch challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing 
suppression was required "because the State failed to prove that the white 
Suzuki parked at his residence was 'readily mobile,"' and therefore failed to 
prove the automobile exception applied. (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Gosch's 
argument fails for several reasons. Because the Suzuki was located on the 
premises authorized to be searched pursuant to the warrant, the search of the 
Suzuki was proper regardless of the applicability of the automobile exception. 
Even if the Suzuki is not considered part of the premises, the search was proper 
under the automobile exception because the information available to law 
enforcement supported the conclusion that it was readily mobile and the district 
court correctly concluded as much. Finally, the inevitable discovery doctrine 
prevents exclusion of any evidence recovered from the Suzuki in this case. 
Gosch has, therefore, failed to show error in the denial of his suppression 
motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). The credibility of the 
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witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district 
court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The Suzuki Was Properly Searched As Part Of The Premises 
The search warrant issued by the magistrate authorized a search of the 
premises located at 11974 Rimrock Road in Hayden, Idaho. (R., p.33.) The 
testimony presented at the suppression hearing established that the Suzuki, 
along with Gosch's Jeep and a white GMC truck were parked in the driveway at 
Gosch's residence on Rimrock Road and one of the detectives conducting 
surveillance on the day the warrant was obtained and executed observed Gosch 
and other individuals carrying items out of the residence and placing them in the 
vehicles parked in the driveway, including the Suzuki. (Tr., p.7, L.16- p.9, L.16, 
p.40, L.1 0 - p.43, L.17.) The district court's Memorandum Opinion supports 
these factual findings (R., pp.155-156), Gosch does not dispute them (see 
generally Appellant's Brief, p.2), and these facts support a conclusion that the 
Suzuki was properly searched as part of the premises identified in the warrant. 
United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459 (1oth Cir. 1990), is instructive. 
In Gottschalk, "a magistrate issued a valid warrant authorizing the search 
of the residence of William Bailey located in Copperton, Utah, as well as two 
other nearby residences. Neither Gottschalk nor his vehicle were mentioned in 
the warrant, and Gottschalk was not a target of the investigation or the warrant." 
915 F.2d at 1459-1460. In fact, the "warrant did not specifically list any vehicles 
to be searched, but rather authorized the search of the entire premises for 
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methamphetamine" and other items related to the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. kL at 1460. When the search was conducted, Gottschalk's 
vehicle, a yellow Cadillac, was "parked in the driveway of the Bailey residence in 
an inoperable state," and had been for several weeks. kL In addition, an 
informant reported seeing the suspects "moving objects from the trunk of a 
yellow automobile parked in the driveway into Bailey's garage." kL Gottschalk's 
Cadillac was searched based on a "belief that the Cadillac was the yellow vehicle 
described by the informant, and because the car was parked on the premises 
where abundant evidence of drug trafficking and weapons offenses had already 
been found." kL Law enforcement also believed the Cadillac "might be another 
stolen vehicle," since a "number of stolen vehicles and stolen car parts were 
found during the search of the three residences." kL Several weapons as well 
as engine parts were found in the Cadillac's trunk. kL 
The district court suppressed the evidence found in the Cadillac after 
concluding the search was improper since Bailey, "the owner of the premises 
described in the search warrant, was not the owner of the Cadillac and because 
the evidence did not establish that the Cadillac was under his dominion and 
control," taking it outside of the search authorized by the warrant Gottschalk, 
915 F.2d at 1460. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating: 
A search warrant authorizing a search of a certain premises 
generally includes any vehicles located within its curtilage if the 
objects of the search might be located therein. One circuit has 
added a limitation to the general rule: that the vehicle to be 
searched must be owned or controlled by the owner of the 
premises searched. Although this limitation has been applauded 
by some commentators, it has been explicitly rejected by at least 
one circuit and several other courts. 
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Gottschalk, 915 F.2d at 1461 (internal case citations, quotations, and ellipsis 
omitted). 
Because the Suzuki was on the premises of the address authorized to be 
searched and because the objects of the search might have been (and were) 
located therein, the search of the Suzuki was proper under the warrant. The 
failure to specifically identify the Suzuki or any other vehicle in the warrant, as 
the Jeep was, does not mean the rule articulated in Gottschalk does not apply. 
Indeed, specifically identifying the Jeep merely served the purpose of allowing 
the Jeep to be searched regardless of its location. In fact, consistent with this 
point, the Jeep was not on the premises when the warrant was executed but was 
located and returned to Rimrock Road and searched after the warrant issued. 
(Tr., p.9, Ls.3-5, p.23, L17- p.25, L12.) 
Even applying the limitation stated in Gottschalk - that the scope of the 
warrant "include[s] those automobiles either actually owned or under the control 
and dominion of the premises owner or, alternatively, those vehicles which 
appear, based on objectively reasonable indicia present at the time of the 
search, to be so controlled," 915 F.2d at 1461 -the search of the Suzuki would 
still fall squarely within the premises authorized by the warrant in this case based 
on the movement of items from Gosch's residence into the car and the discovery 
that the Suzuki was his. Compare Gottschalk, 915 F.2d at 1461-1462. This 
Court can therefore affirm the district court's order denying Gosch's suppression 
motion on this basis. See Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County 
Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App. 2010) ("an 
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appellate court may affirm the district court's decision if an alternative legal basis 
supports it"); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 
Idaho 573, 580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993) ("where an order of the district court is 
correct but based upon an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm upon the 
correct theory"). 
D. The Search Of Gosch's Vehicle Was Justified By Probable Cause To 
Believe It Contained Contraband 
Even if the warrant's authorization to search the premises did not 
encompass the Suzuki, the search of the Suzuki was appropriate pursuant to the 
automobile exception. "There are ... exceptions to the general rule that a 
warrant must be secured before a search is undertaken; one is the so-called 
'automobile exception."' California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). The 
automobile exception authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle and the 
containers therein when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains 
contraband or evidence of criminal activity. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 
572 (1991 ); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982). "Probable 
cause is established if the facts available to the officer at the time of the search 
would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items 
to be searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. 
Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing 
Ross, 456 U.S. at 823; see also Florida v. Harris,_ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 
1055 (2013). "[W]hen a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully 
stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has 
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probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search 
it without a warrant." Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148 (quoting 
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005). 
A reliable drug-detection dog alerted on the Suzuki, providing probable 
cause to believe the Suzuki contained drugs. The district court found as much 
and Gosch concedes this fact on appeal. (R., p.162; Appellant's Brief, p. 12 n.3 
("Mr. Gosch does not challenge the district court's holding that the State had 
probable cause once the drug dog alerted on the vehicle. An alert by a reliable, 
trained canine unit provides probable cause.").) Instead, Gosch argues that the 
district court erred in finding the Suzuki was "readily mobile," contending the 
state had the burden of proving such and failed to do so. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.5-12.) Gosch is incorrect. 
In Carney, the Supreme Court noted its cases "have consistently 
recognized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile 
exception." 471 U.S. at 390. "The mobility of automobiles . . . creates 
circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous 
enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible." l5;L at 391 (citation and 
quotations omitted). "However, although ready mobility alone was perhaps the 
original justification for the vehicle exception, ... later cases have made clear 
that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception." l5;L "Besides the 
element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the 
expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than 
that relating to one's home or office." Jsi (citation and quotations omitted). 
9 
Accordingly, "[e]ven in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, 
the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle 
justified application of the vehicular exception." kl "These reduced expectations 
of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view, 
but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public 
highways." kl at 392 (citation omitted). 
While "ready mobility" is one of the justifications underlying the automobile 
exception, the Supreme Court has never held that the state has the burden of 
proof of the existence of the justifications for the exception in any particular case. 
Rather, the automobile exception allows a warrantless search where there is 
probable cause to believe the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a 
crime. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148. While the state has the 
burden of proving the existence of probable cause, it does not have the burden 
of proving one or more of the justifications for the exception. Gosch has cited no 
authority to the contrary. (See Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Gosch's argument to the 
contrary is premised upon the following italicized language from Carney, which, 
in context, reads: 
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is 
readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not 
regularly used for residential purposes-temporary or otherwise-the 
two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the 
vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if 
not actually moving. Second, there is a reduced expectation of 
privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject 
to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. At 
least in these circumstances, the overriding societal interests in 
effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before the 
vehicle and its occupants become unavailable. 
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471 U.S. at 392-393 (quoted, in part, in Appellant's Brief at p.11) (emphasis 
added). 
According to Gosch, the italicized language above precludes the search 
of the Suzuki under the automobile exception because the Suzuki "was not being 
used on the highway and it was found stationary at a residence" and therefore 
"[t]he two justifications for the exception are not in play here." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.11.) The Suzuki's location does not establish that it was not readily mobile nor 
subject to regulation. A vehicle is not readily mobile only when it is actually 
mobile or has been seen driving. If that were true, the term "readily" would be 
superfluous in expressing the rationale for the automobile exception and the 
entire purpose of the exception vvould be undermined because the point is to 
allow a search of the automobile before it moves, i.e., becomes unavailable. 
Carney, 471 U.S. at 393. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Carney applied the 
automobile exception to a motor home that was never seen moving. kl at 388. 
Nor does the Suzuki's presence in Gosch's driveway demonstrate, as Gosch 
contends, that the regulation justification is "not in play." Regardless, as noted, 
the state was not required to prove the existence of any underlying justification, 
including that the Suzuki was in fact regulated, in order for the automobile 
exception to apply. 
With respect to Gosch's argument that the automobile exception does not 
apply when a car is parked in a place "regularly used for residential purposes" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has correctly rejected 
this interpretation of the language of Carney. The defendant in United States v. 
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Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1529 (101h Cir. 1993), made a similar argument to which 
the court responded: " ... Ludwig misunderstands Carney. The question is only 
whether the 'vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would conclude 
that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle."' As in Ludwig, the 
Suzuki was "obviously not being used as a residence" and could, therefore, be 
searched under the automobile exception once there was probable cause to 
believe it contained contraband. kL 
Even if the state was required to prove the Suzuki was "readily mobile," it 
met its burden in this case. On this point, the district court correctly concluded. 
In the present case, Defendant contends that since the 
Suzuki "was not about to be moved" and was "secure where it 
was," the mobility concerns that justify the automobile exception 
were not present when the Suzuki was searched without a warrant. 
. . . Here, the Suzuki was located in a driveway in close proximity 
to Defendant's residence. There was no testimony that it was 
mounted on blocks, had flat tires or was otherwise inoperable. Cf. 
[United States v.l Hatley, [15 F.3d 856, 859 (91h Cir. 1994)]. 
Contrary to Defendant's argument, the actions of the Defendant on 
the day of the search indicated that he was using, or was about to 
use, both the Suzuki and the Jeep to transport belongings from his 
residence to another location, which in and of itself indicates that 
the Suzuki was capable of being moved in the manner 
contemplated by the automobile exception. The fact that the 
Suzuki was parked in a residence driveway and without an operator 
when the warrantless search commenced does not place the 
Suzuki outside of the automobile exception. 
(R., p.161.) 
Gosch's only argument that the court's finding of ready mobility is 
erroneous is that "simply placing property in a vehicle is insufficient to 
demonstrate that the vehicle is readily mobile, especially when a car is parked at 
a residence - the trunk of a vehicle can be used for storage just as easily as for 
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transport." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) While Gosch's storage hypothesis could 
theoretically be true, this does not mean the facts cited by the court are 
inadequate to establish ready mobility. Cf. State v. Nicolescu, 156 Idaho 287, 
_, 323 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Ct. App. 2014) ("the existence of an alternative 
innocent explanation does not negate the fact that the officers had reasonable 
grounds to believe Nicolescu was intoxicated"). Gosch suggests that, in order to 
establish ready mobility, there must be evidence that the car "has been recently 
driven."4 (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Not only is this evidentiary standard 
unsupported by any authority, it is contrary to the purpose of the exception and 
to cases applying it. See,~. Carney, supra. 
Gosch is incorrect in his assertion that the state is required to prove one 
or more of the underlying justifications underlying the automobile exception in 
order for the exception to apply. Even if the Court concludes otherwise, the 
district court's conclusion that the Suzuki was readily mobile is supported by the 
evidence. Gosch has failed to establish otherwise. 
E. Even If The Search Of The Suzuki Was Not Proper Pursuant To The 
Warrant Or The Automobile Exception, The Evidence In The Suzuki 
Would Have Inevitably Been Discovered 
Assuming that the search of the Suzuki was not properly included as part 
of the premises or did not fall within the automobile exception, exclusion of the 
evidence discovered therein would be improper under the inevitable discovery 
4 Gosch "does not disagree with the district court that the fact the Suzuki was not 
about to be moved means that a vehicle is not readily mobile." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.10.) 
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doctrine. See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812-
813 (Ct. App. 2002) (inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the 
exclusionary rule). Where the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of 
proof that the evidence at issue inevitably would have been found by lawful 
means, then exclusion of the evidence is improper even if it was actually 
obtained by constitutionally improper means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984); Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001). 
The underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the 
prosecution in the same position it would have been absent the police 
misconduct, not a worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 
102, 57 P.3d at 813. 
In response to Gosch's suppression motion, the state sought application 
of the inevitable discovery doctrine in the event the district court found the search 
otherwise improper. (R., pp.88-89.) After seeing the items moved from Gosch's 
home to the Suzuki and obtaining a positive alert on the Suzuki, the police 
undoubtedly would have been able to obtain a separate search warrant for the 
Suzuki. Indeed, Gosch concedes on appeal that probable cause to search the 
Suzuki existed "once the dog alerted on the vehicle." (Appellant's Brief, p.12 
n.3.) Application of the inevitable discovery doctrine would, therefore, prevent 
exclusion of any evidence from the Suzuki in this case. 
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F. if This Court Concludes That The Suzuki Was Not Properly Searched 
Under Any Theory, Any Error In The Denial Of The Suppression Motion Is 
Harmless At Least As To Gosch's Conviction For Manufacturing 
Marijuana 
An error "will be deemed harmless if the appellate court is able to declare, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the 
event complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 
533, 537, 285 P.3d 348, 352 (Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). If this Court finds 
error in the denial of the suppression, any error is harmless at least as to the 
manufacturing marijuana charge. 
The manufacturing marijuana charge was based on "compounding or 
converting or processing marijuana into honey oil" and the jury was so instructed. 
(R., pp.58, 167, 252.) The honey oil was found in Gosch's home along with 
several other items related to the manufacture of marijuana. (See R., p.35.) 
Thus, even assuming the evidence in the Suzuki should have been suppressed, 
there was still ample evidence to, at a minimum, convict Gosch of manufacturing 
marijuana. 5 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and the 
district court's order denying Gosch's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 3rd day of July 2014. 
5 Because the jury acquitted Gosch of trafficking in cocaine (R., p.266), 
suppression of the cocaine found in the Suzuki (R., p.35) would be moot. 
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